وللمزيد عن نقد مفهوم الرد المرن الذي يتضمن القوات التقليدية والثورية، كما هو مطبق في مياسة

: bil " s",skj u Kori N. Schake, "Case Against Flexible Response: Berlin Policy and Planning in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations" (PhD diss.,

University of Maryland, 1996). (22) Thies, "On NATO", 22.

Ivo H. Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: : illis zbil, NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces Since 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

: il () * Yost, "History of NATO", 232. • U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, New Technology

for NATO: Implementing Follow-on Forces Attack (Washington, DC: Goverment Printing Office, 1987).

وللاطلاع على تقييم لترات حلف شمال الأطلنطى التقليدية صادر في أواخر الثمانينيات انظر:

James M. Garrett, The Tenuous Balance: Conventional Forces in Central

Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview Pres, 1989). (24) NATO Ministerial Communique, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept"

(1991), 1 - 15. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49 - 95/c 911107 a.htm (accessed June 23,

2008). (25) Yost, "NATO and the Anticipatory Use of Force", 50.

or - u wadi (1)

وللاطلاع على تقييم لحرب كوسوفو انظر:

* U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After Action Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2000), http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS 16504 (accessed June 23, 2008). * John Norris, Collision Course: NATO, Russia, and Kosovo (Westport, CT:

Praeger, 2005). * Dag Henriksen, NATO's Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998 - 1999 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007).

(27) من بين هذه الأعمال على سبيل المثال:

• Mike Wells, "Reaction Force Reshapes NATO Doctrine"International

Defense Review 29 (1996): 73 - 76. * Ove Bring, "After Kosovo: NATO Should Formulate a Doctrine on Humanitarian Intervention", Journal of Legal Studies 10 (1999 - 2000): 61 - 66.

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